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ABSTRACT
Deep neural network image classifiers are reported to be susceptible to adversarial
evasion attacks, which use carefully crafted images created to mislead a classifier.
Recently, various kinds of adversarial attack methods have been proposed, most
of which focus on adding small perturbations to input images. Despite the success
of existing approaches, the way to generate realistic adversarial images with small
perturbations remains a challenging problem. In this paper, we aim to address this
problem by proposing a novel adversarial method, which generates adversarial
examples by imposing not only perturbations but also spatial distortions on input
images, including scaling, rotation, shear, and translation. As humans are less sus-
ceptible to small spatial distortions, the proposed approach can produce visually
more realistic attacks with smaller perturbations, able to deceive classifiers with-
out affecting human predictions. We learn our method by amortized techniques
with neural networks and generate adversarial examples efficiently by a forward
pass of the networks. Extensive experiments on attacking different types of non-
robustified classifiers and robust classifiers with defence show that our method has
state-of-the-art performance in comparison with advanced attack parallels.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have enjoyed great success in many areas such as com-
puter vision and natural language processing. Nevertheless, DNNs are demonstrated to be vulner-
able to adversarial attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Nguyen et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016),
which are data samples carefully crafted to be misclassified by DNN classifiers. For example, in
image classification, an adversarial example may imperceptibly look like a legitimate data sample
in a ground-truth class but misleads a DNN classifier to predict it into a maliciously-chosen target
class or any class different from the ground truth. The former and latter are referred to as targeted
attack and untargeted attack, respectively. In addition, adversarial attacks can be categorised into
poisoning attacks (attacks during the training phase of classifiers) vs evasion attacks (attacks during
the testing/inference phase) and whitebox attacks vs blackbox attacks. For whitebox attacks, the
attacker has full access to the model architecture and parameters of a classifier, while those kinds
of information are invisible to blackbox attackers. In this paper, we are particularly interested in
untargeted, evasion, and whitebox attacks. However, many of the attacks discussed in this paper
(including the proposed ones) can be easily adapted into targeted or blackbox settings.
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Shown in Goodfellow et al. (2014b), image classifiers based on DNNs (e.g., Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) (LeCun et al., 1998)) are susceptible to small but carefully-chosen perturbations.
Therefore, significant research efforts have been devoted into perturbation-based adversarial at-
tacks, such as those in Goodfellow et al. (2014b); Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016); Carlini & Wagner
(2017); Xiao et al. (2018a). Usually, a classifier is more easily fooled with larger perturbations, but
this may result in adversarial examples that are less similar to original/real images. In practice, it is
equally important that adversarial examples should mislead the classifier as well as “look like” real
images. Therefore, the general task for perturbation-based methods can be formulated as misleading
a classifier with a minimum amount of perturbation.
It is reported that the intermediate feature maps (convolutional layer activations) in a CNN are not
actually invariant to spatial transformations of the input data, due to its limited, pre-defined pool-
ing mechanism for dealing with spatial variations (Jaderberg et al., 2015; Cohen & Welling, 2015;
Lenc & Vedaldi, 2015). Therefore, one can imagine generating adversarial examples by incorpo-
rating spatial distortions to original images. For example, Figure 1a shows that a CNN classifier
successfully classifies the digits of MNIST (LeCun & Cortes, 1998). However, it is misled by the
adversarial examples with properly-chosen spatial distortions. In contrast, humans are usually less
influenced by such distortions. Motivated by this demonstration, by combining spatial distortions
with perturbations, we may be able to generate more realistic adversarial examples with smaller
perturbations, which can challenge classifiers without affecting human predictions.
To further demonstrate this idea, given some samples of original MNIST images shown in Figure 1b,
we apply a widely-used perturbation-based attack, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al.,
2018), with the maximum perturbations of  = 0.3 (the standard setting of the attack), to attack
the previously-mentioned classifier, the corresponding adversarial examples of which are shown in
Figure 1c. It can be observed that those adversarial examples, though they fool the classifier, can be
detected by humans, meaning that one can easily distinguish real and adversarial examples. On the
other hand, shown in Figure 1d, the approach introduced in this paper, combines spatial distortions
and perturbations to achieve similar attack performance as PGD, but with much smaller perturbation
( = 0.1). Our adversarial examples are clearly less distinguishable from real images by humans.
Motivated by the above idea, in this paper, we propose a new kind of adversarial attack on DNN-
based image classifiers, which generalises the conventional perturbation-based attacks with ad-
ditional spatial distortions. We name our framework SdpAdv (Spatial distortion + perturbation
Adversary). Specifically, to attack a pretrained classifier, our approach leverages a trainable joint
process of two major steps, where it first generates a spatially distorted intermediate image by per-
forming affine-transformations on a real image and then generates the final adversarial image by
adding perturbations to the intermediate image.
The proposed SdpAdv has the following appealing properties:
• With the help of spatial distortions, our method is able to achieve state-of-the-art adversarial
attack performance with much less perturbations than existing approaches purely based on
perturbations, which generates less distinguishable adversarial examples.
• With a differentiable framework, the learning of SdpAdv can be done efficiently in an
amortized way, where two neural networks are learned to generate the specific parameters
of the spatial distortions and perturbations for an input image. After SdpAdv is trained, it
only takes one-step forward propagation in the two neural networks to generate adversarial
examples, which enjoys better efficiency in the testing phase.
• As most of existing robust classifier with defences, like those in Samangouei et al. (2018);
Matyasko & Chau (2018), are designed to defend against perturbation-based attacks, they
can be less effective to our attacks based on spatial distortions (Xiao et al., 2018b).
• Unlike many other whitebox attack methods, which usually require full access to the model
structures and parameters of the classifier, SdpAdv only needs to be trained with access
to the predicted probabilities of the classifier and directly generates adversarial examples
from input images in the testing phase. That is to say, SdpAdv fits the settings of the
semi-whitebox attack (Xiao et al., 2018a), which can be more applicable in practice.
To demonstrate the superiority of our proposed method, we conduct extensive comparisons with
state-of-the-art adversarial attacks. The experimental results show that SdpAdv is able to achieve
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Figure 1: Image classification demo on MNIST dataset. The CNN classifier trained with the training set of
the original images achieves 99.15% test accuracy. (a) Original image samples and corresponding spatially
distorted images with the predicted labels. (b) Original image samples. (c) The corresponding adversarial
examples of PGD with the maximum perturbations of  = 0.3. (d) The corresponding adversarial examples of
the attack method proposed in this paper with spatial distortions plus the maximum perturbations of  = 0.1.
The accuracies under both kinds of attacks are less than 0.05.
better attack performance against both unprotected and robust classifiers. More interestingly, using
less perturbation, our adversarial examples are much less distinguishable from real images.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We now introduce the background and related work on adversarial attacks. Suppose that an image
x in the ground-truth label y is the input of a neural network classifier f . The predicted label of f
given x is denoted as f(x). We assume f(x) = y for a well-trained classifier and will use them inter-
changeably hereafter. The general goal of adversarial attacks is to generate an adversarial example
xA, which should “look like” x but change the prediction of f , i.e., f(x) 6= f(xA). Conversely, the
goal of a defender is to train a robust classifier to defend against adversarial attacks.
2.1 PERTURBATION-BASED ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
As the name implies, perturbation-based attacks generate xA by adding small perturbations η to
x: xA = x + η. In general, η can be constructed by either: η := argmaxη′:‖η′‖≤ `f (xA, y) or
η := argminη′:f(x)6=f(xA) ‖η′‖, where `f (·) denotes the cross-entropy loss of f and ‖ · ‖ can
be the L∞ in accordance with Madry et al. (2018); Athalye et al. (2018) or other norms. As
finding the closed-form solution for the above problem can be hard, Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014b) is a one-step attack that applies a first-order approximation:
η =  · sign(∇x`f (x, y)). Several extensions and variants to FGSM have been proposed, such as
Randomized FGSM (Trame`r et al., 2018), Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2016), and
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018). In addition to FGSM, there are numerous
perturbation-based attacks that use different approximations to the above problem. For example,
DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016) generates adversarial perturbations by taking a step in the
direction of the closest decision boundary in an iterative manner and CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017)
is an attack based on the optimisation of a modified loss function with implicit box-constraints.
Despite their success, the optimisation process of the above methods may have to be done for every
test image, which could be inefficient in practice. To alleviate this problem, several attack meth-
ods have been proposed to directly generate perturbations by feeding real images into a generator:
η = g(x), which is usually implemented by neural networks. For example, Adversarial Transfor-
mation Networks (ATNs) (Baluja & Fischer, 2018) trains g by minimising the combination of the
re-ranking loss and an L2 norm loss, so as to constrain xA to be close to x in terms of L2. Instead
of using an L2 norm, the AdvGAN (Xiao et al., 2018a) attack adopts a Generative Adversarial Net-
work (GAN) (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) framework with a discriminator to encourage the perceptual
quality of the generated attacks. Moreover, the Rob-GAN (Liu & Hsieh, 2019) attack also uses a
GAN framework, where the discriminator is trained to distinguish between the attacks generated by
PGD and those by the generator.
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2.2 NON-PERTURBATION-BASED ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Here we consider non-perturbation-based methods as attacks that do not purely rely on manipulating
the pixel values of original images. Compared with perturbation-based attacks, to our knowledge,
research on non-perturbation-based methods is relatively rare. Recently, by adding perturbations to
the latent space learned by Auxiliary Classifier GAN (AC-GAN) (Odena et al., 2017), the attack in
Song et al. (2018) generates adversarial examples for a specific label from scratch without taking
a real image as input. Alternatively, there are attacks that apply spatial transformations to original
images. Spatial Transformation Method (STM)1 used in the CleverHans library (Papernot et al.,
2018) constructs adversarial candidates by rotation and translation then selects the one that chal-
lenges the classifier most. As the selection process is non-differentiable, STM relies on the SPSA
adversary (Uesato et al., 2018), which is a gradient-free optimization method. Given a real image,
stAdv (Xiao et al., 2018b) is differentiable method that finds a flow field, each cell of which captures
the transformation direction of one pixel of an input image.
3 METHODS
3.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Here we first present the problem definition of adversarial attacks, which generalises the one of
perturbation-based methods, discussed in Section 2. Suppose that a real image and its ground-truth
label is denoted by x ∈ RL and y ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, respectively, where L represents the image
dimension and K is the number of unique labels. We consider a pretrained classifier f taking
x as input and implemented with multilayer neural networks, where the last layer has K output
units, denoted by fl(x). The output label of f(x) : RL → {1, · · · ,K} is obtained by: f(x) :=
argmaxl softmax(fl(x)). Given image x, we would like to find an adversarial example, xA ∈O(x), that challenges the classifier f most, i.e., f(xA) 6= f(x), where O(x) denotes the set of
candidate adversarial images. Given the notation, the most challenging adversarial example xA can
be generated by the following optimisation:
xA := argmax
x′∈O(x)
`f (x
′, y). (1)
In particular, O(x) is usually defined along with the way of generating attacks. For example, for
perturbation-based methods, O(x) can be a L2-ball (or other norms) centred at x with the radius of
: O(x) = {x′, ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ }. To make the candidates “perceptually close” to x,  is set to a small
value. However, this definition clearly does not fit the proposed approach with spatial distortions,
as a small spatial distortion usually keeps an image looking similar but can result in a large L2
difference. Before introducing our definition of O(x), we present the proposed way of generating
adversarial examples in SdpAdv. Given an real image x, SdpAdv conducts two major steps: 1)
the spatial distortion step, where a spatial transformation t : RL → RL: is applied to generate a
distorted image xT := t(x); 2) the perturbation step, where a perturbation η is imposed on xT to
generate the final adversarial example: xA := xT + η.
In the spatial distortion step, we consider the affine transformation, which is a widely-used geo-
metric transformation for images. Simply parameterised by a matrix of six real numbers, an affine
transformation can be a composition of four linear transformations including scaling, rotation, shear,
and translation. Given the position of a pixel on a 2D image, (µ, ν), an affine transformation with a
parameter matrix θ transforms the pixel into a new position (µ′, ν′) as follows:[
µ′
ν′
1
]
=
[
a b e
c d f
0 0 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ
[
µ
ν
1
]
, (2)
where if a = d = 1 and b = e = c = f = 0, we get the parameter matrix for the identity
transformation, denoted by θI . In the case of an image transformation, as the new position (µ′, ν′)
can be fractional numbers and so not necessarily lie on the integer image grid, we apply bilinear
interpolation to the original image before transformation, following (Jaderberg et al., 2015). With
1https://cleverhans.readthedocs.io/en/latest/source/attacks.html
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Figure 2: The adversarial generator architecture of SdpAdv.
this notation, to generate a distorted image xT from x, we apply an affine transformation t with a
parameter matrix θx specific to x: xT := tθx(x). Recall that xT has to be perceptually close to x,
thus we would like to avoid over-transforming xT . Therefore, we enforce θx to be in the L2-ball of
θI : ‖θx−θI‖ ≤ γ. After the spatial distortion step, we add the perturbation of ηx into xT to generate
xA in the perturbation step: xA := xT +ηx, where ‖ηx‖ ≤ . This step is similar to the conventional
perturbation-based methods, except that the perturbations are added into the intermediate image xT
instead of the input image x.
Finally, the optimisation problem of SdpAdv can be described as: Given an individual image x,
finding the optimal θx and ηx under the constraints of ‖θx − θI‖ ≤ γ and ‖ηx‖ ≤ , which can also
be formulated as:
Ex∼Pd
[
max
η′:‖η′‖≤,θ′:‖θ′−θI‖≤γ
`f (tθ′(x) + η
′, y)
]
, (3)
where Pd denotes the data distribution of the image training set. It is also noteworthy that the
constraints on θ and η define the set of candidate adversarial examples, i.e., O(x).
3.2 AMORTIZED OPTIMISATION SOLUTION
In general, directly solving the problem in Eq. (3) involves the optimisation for every input image x,
as in many existing perturbation-based algorithms such as CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017). Such an
optimisation process can be challenging and inefficient in practical cases, where real-times attacks
may be important. Alternatively, we leverage the amortized optimisation with neural networks to
bypass this problem.
First, we introduce two families of neural networks: Hsd := {hsd : θ′ := hsd(x) ∧ ‖θ′ − θI‖ ≤ γ}
and Hp := {hp : η′ := hp(x) ∧ ‖η′‖ ≤ }. In particular, the family of Hsd consists of neural net-
works with the same network architecture, each of which, hsd, takes x as input and outputs the affine
parameter matrix θ′ in the L2-ball with θI as the centre. Similarly, hp outputs the perturbation of
η′. Due to the infinite capacity of neural networks, they can be used to approximate any continuous
function up to any level of precision. Therefore, our goal is to find two neural networks h∗sd ∈ Hsd
and h∗p ∈ Hp, which are used to approximate the optimisation in Eq. (3), based on the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. If the familyH defined above has infinite capacity, the optimization problem in Eq. (3)
is equivalent to the following:
max
hsd∈Hsd,hp∈Hp
Ex∼Pd
[
`f
(
thsd(x)(x) + hp(thsd(x)(x)), y
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Ladv
. (4)
The proof is in the appendix.
3.3 MODEL ARCHITECTURE OF SDPADV
With Theorem 1, we can amortize the optimisation of SdpAdv by training two neural networks: hsd
and hp. Equipped with the two neural networks, we are able to build an end-to-end adversarial
generator, g, that takes x as input and outputs xA by imposing spatial distortions and perturbations:
5
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xA := g(x). The architecture of the proposed generator of SdpAdv is shown in Figure 2. In
the spatial distortion step, we adopt the architecture of STN (Jaderberg et al., 2015). Specifically,
following Jaderberg et al. (2015), we name hsd to the “localisation network”, which takes x as input
and outputs the optimal parameter matrix of the affine transformation, θx. After that, θx is fed into
the “grid generator” to create a sampling grid, which is a set of points where x should be sampled
to produce xT (Jaderberg et al., 2015). In the perturbation step, the adversarial generator takes
the output of the previous step, xT , and then adds the optimal perturbation, ηx to obtain xA. In
particular, ηx is generated from hp, named the “perturbation network”: ηx := hp(xT ). Finally, the
operations of the adversarial generator can be summarised as:
g(x) := thsd(x)(x) + hp(thsd(x)(x)). (5)
3.4 LEARNING OF SDPADV
Given the architecture of the adversarial generator, the learning of SdpAdv is equivalent to that
of the two neural networks: hsd and hp, by minimising the loss of Ladv in Eq. (4). To train the
model with stochastic gradient descent (SGD), it is important to show that the model construction
is differentiable so that the loss gradients can be backpropagated. It is not hard to see that hp is
trainable, which follows a similar construction to residual neural networks (He et al., 2016). Shown
in Jaderberg et al. (2015), the construction of STN also allows the loss gradients to flow back to the
grid generator as well as the localisation network hsd.
In addition to Ladv, recall that we need to enforce ‖θx − θI‖ ≤ γ and ‖ηx‖ ≤ . Therefore, we
introduce two regularisation loss functions, respectively, as follows:
Lθ := Ex∼Pd [‖θx − θI‖], (6)
Lη := Ex∼Pd [max(0, ‖ηx‖ − )], (7)
where ‖ ·‖ is the L2 norm and Eq. (7) is the hinge loss used in Xiao et al. (2018a). In our implemen-
tation, after generating θx and ηx, we apply θx := min(θI + γ, θx) and ηx := min(, ηx) to keep
xA in the candidate set O(x) defined by our method.
Inspired by the GAN construction in Xiao et al. (2018a), we also introduce a neural network-based
discriminator d to encourage that adversarial images are perceptually close to real images. However,
different from Xiao et al. (2018a), our d distinguishes between xT (positive sample) and xA(negative
sample) and does not care about the spatial distortion step. This is because xT is expected to nat-
urally “look similar” to the original image x under small affine transformations. Therefore, it is
unnecessary to use the discriminator to check this. Following Goodfellow et al. (2014a), the GAN
loss is as follows:
LGAN := E x∼Pd,
xT :=thsd(x)(x)
[logD(xT )] + E x∼Pd,
xT :=thsd(x)(x),
xA:=xA+hp(xT )
[log(1−D(xA))] . (8)
In conclusion, the learning of the adversarial generator can be done by minimising the following
loss function:
Lg := Ladv + αLθ + βLη + λLGAN, (9)
where α, β, γ are the weight parameters for the losses. In addition, the discriminator can be trained
by maximising the GAN loss, similar to Goodfellow et al. (2014a); Xiao et al. (2018a).
3.5 COMPARISON TO OTHER METHODS
Among the many related adversarial attack methods discussed in Section 2, we consider Adv-
GAN (Xiao et al., 2018a), STM implemented in CleverHans (Papernot et al., 2018), and stAdv (Xiao
et al., 2018b) as the most related ones. To our knowledge, SdpAdv is the first technique that com-
bines both spatial distortion and perturbation to generate adversarial examples, while others only
consider either of the two attacks. Our method can be viewed as a generalisation to AdvGAN. That
is to say, if we set γ to 0, then the affine transformations in our method will approach to the identity
transformation and our SdpAdv reduces to AdvGAN. Despite the fact that STM and stAdv only con-
sider spatial transformations, the way of conducting spatial transformations in our model is different
from theirs. Specifically, STM only allows two kinds of transformations: rotation and translation
6
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while affine transformations used in our model are more flexible. More importantly, STM proposes
spatially distorted candidates and uses a non-differentiable approach to select adversarial examples
from those candidates, while ours is a differentiable method, which is more flexible and easier to
train. In stAdv, each pixel in the input image has its specific flow vector to capture the transformation
direction of the pixel, making the optimisation of the flow vectors potentially inefficient in practice.
In contrast, ours uses one affine transformation that is specific to one image, for all the pixels of that
image. Consequently, we only need to optimise for the six cells in the affine parameter matrix for
each image, which can be efficiently done by a forward pass in the localisation network.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct experiments to compare the performance of SdpAdv with other state-of-
the-art adversarial attack methods on attacking both non-robustified image classifiers (raw classifiers
without defences) and robust classifiers with defences.
4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
Here we mainly consider the MNIST (LeCun & Cortes, 1998) and Fashion MNIST (Xiao et al.,
2017) datasets, each of which consists of 60,000 images of ten classes.
Settings of the classifiers: For non-robustified classifiers, we consider: Model-A, a CNN-based
classifier with “X-Conv(64, 8×8, 2)-ReLU-Conv(128, 6×6, 2)-ReLU-Conv(128, 5×5, 1)-ReLU-
FC(10)-Softmax” and Model-B, a fully-connected (FC) classifier with “X-FC(200)-ReLU-FC(200)-
ReLU-FC(10)-Softmax” (Samangouei et al., 2018), where X denotes input layer of image. The two
classifiers were pretrained on the standard training set (50,000 images) of MNIST and Fashion
MNIST. Additionally, we consider robust classifiers based on the following three state-of-the-art
defences: Defense-GAN (Samangouei et al., 2018), Adversarial-Critic (Adv-Critic) (Matyasko &
Chau, 2018), and Adversarial-Training (Adv-Train) with FGSM ( = 0.3) (Trame`r et al., 2018).
All three robust classifiers share the same model architectures with the non-robustified classifiers
but defend adversarial attacks in different ways. We used the original implementations of Defense-
GAN2 and Adv-Critic3, and implemented Adv-Train ourselves on top of CleverHans.
Settings of SdpAdv: In the experiments, we used the following architectures for the adversarial
generator (g) and discriminator (d): the localisation network (hsd) with “X-FC(20)-FC(6)”; the per-
turbation network (hp) with “X-FC(128)-FC(128)-X”; d with “X-FC(64)-FC(32)-FC(2)-Softmax”.
It is noteworthy that other architectures for the above neural networks can also be used in SdpAdv.
In the training phase of SdpAdv, we held out 10,000 images in the training set as our validation set
and trained our method on the remaining images in the training set with 100 iterations. We reported
the attack results with the best model in the validation set. We initialised α to 5.0 and used a decay
factor of 0.8 for every ten iterations until it reached to 0.8. β and λ were set to 1.0. We set γ to 0.3
and varied  in the range of {0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. If  = 0.0, it means that perturbation is turned off in
SdpAdv and we name this variant of our model to “SdAdv”. The learning of the adversarial genera-
tor and discriminator was done by Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with the learning rate of 0.0005 and
0.00005, respectively.
Settings of the other attacks: Here we mainly focus on whitebox attacks, where the attackers
have full access to the classifiers. However, our SdpAdv only needs the output logits of the classifier
in its training phase and does not require any additional information in the testing phase, simi-
lar to AdvGAN (Xiao et al., 2018a). For comparison, we consider the following state-of-the-art
perturbation-based attack methods: FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014b), PGD (Madry et al., 2018),
Momentum Iterative Method (Dong et al., 2018), and AdvGAN (Xiao et al., 2018a). We used the
CleverHans (Papernot et al., 2018) implementations of the first three attacks with the standard set-
tings except varying  in the range of {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. We implemented AdvGAN by turning off the
spatial distortion step in our SdpAdv. For non-perturbation-based attacks, we consider STM imple-
2https://github.com/kabkabm/defensegan
3https://github.com/aam-at/adversary_critic
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mented in CleverHans and stAdv (Xiao et al., 2018b) implemented by Dumont et al. (2018)4. All
the classifiers and attacks (including the proposed ones) were implemented in TensorFlow5.
Table 1: Classification accuracies on MNIST. The first row shows the accuracies of the classifiers under
no attack. The first three attacks (including the proposed SdAdv) are spatial-distortion-based methods. The
following four attacks are perturbation-based methods. SdpAdv with  > 0.0 is the proposed method with both
spatial distortions and perturbations. For the non-robustified classifiers,  varies in the range of {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}
while for the robust classifiers,  is set to 0.3. In the last column of “sum”, we show the summation over the
accuracies of all the classifiers with  = 0.3. Best results from the attacks with perturbations are in boldface.
(a) Model A
Attack
Classifier Non-robustified Adv-Critic Defense-GAN Adv-Train Sum
No attack 0.9914 0.9901 0.9914 0.9916 3.9645
STM 0.4959 0.4449 0.1434 0.9481 2.0323
stAdv 0.1305 0.9933 0.2015 0.5388 1.8641
SdAdv (ours) 0.0517 0.2365 0.0476 0.074 0.4098
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
FGSM 0.7788 0.3457 0.1902 0.3595 0.8104 0.9481 2.3082
PGD 0.4239 0.0128 0.0059 0.0462 0.8545 0.0926 0.9992
MIM 0.4134 0.0911 0.0868 0.1140 0.8032 0.1584 1.1624
AdvGAN 0.9915 0.7679 0.1573 0.6820 0.3010 0.9278 2.0681
SdpAdv (ours) 0.0418 0.0259 0.0204 0.2536 0.0266 0.033 0.3336
(b) Model B
Attack
Classifier Non-robustified Adv-Critic Defense-GAN Adv-Train Sum
No attack 0.9831 0.9817 0.9831 0.9757 3.9236
STM 0.1939 0.2044 0.0792 0.1200 0.5975
stAdv 0.1270 0.9860 0.1207 0.3436 1.5773
SdAdv (ours) 0.0502 0.1363 0.0666 0.0744 0.3275
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
FGSM 0.3584 0.0901 0.0457 0.3147 0.7710 0.8753 2.0067
PGD 0.1198 0.0205 0.0137 0.0920 0.8509 0.0147 0.9713
MIM 0.1146 0.0272 0.0211 0.1087 0.7635 0.0373 0.9306
AdvGAN 0.6006 0.2432 0.0504 0.7733 0.1110 0.2868 1.2215
SdpAdv (ours) 0.0281 0.0233 0.0223 0.0821 0.0252 0.0741 0.2037
4.2 RESULTS
For quantitative results, we report the classification accuracies on the test set of the classifiers under
the attacks. For attackers, lower accuracy indicates better attack performance. The accuracy results
for MNIST and Fashion MNIST are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
We have the following remarks on our results: 1) In general, our proposed SdpAdv performs the best
on attacking both non-robustified and robust classifiers in the comparison with other attacks. This
is particularly demonstrated in the “Sum” column, which can be viewed as a measure of the overall
performance. 2) In comparison with attacks using perturbations, with very small perturbation mag-
nitudes (e.g.,  = 0.1), other methods struggle to perform, while with the help of spatial distortions,
SdpAdv is able to achieve impressive attack results, generating less noisy attacks without sacrificing
performance. 3) Among the attacks with spatial distortions, our variant, SdAdv, achieves the best
attack results in most cases. 4) We observe that robust classifiers such as Defense-GAN, which are
usually designed to defend against perturbations, are much less effective against spatial distortions.
To further study our methods, we compare the test accuracies, L2 norm, and running time of the
compared attacks in Table 3. It can be found out that our proposed approaches are able to perform
attacks as efficient as FGSM, which is a one-step operation, but with much better performance. It
is also noteworthy that the adversarial examples generated by our methods can result in large values
of L2 norm but they can look very realistic, shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
4https://github.com/rakutentech/stAdv
5https://www.tensorflow.org
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Table 2: Classification accuracies on Fashion MNIST.
(a) Model A
Attack
Classifier Non-robustified Adv-Critic Defense-GAN Adv-Train Sum
No attack 0.9016 0.9032 0.9016 0.9057 3.6121
STM 0.1063 0.2153 0.3548 0.1296 0.8060
stAdv 0.0705 0.8868 0.0628 0.1930 1.2131
SdAdv (ours) 0.1762 0.3286 0.1372 0.1502 0.7922
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
FGSM 0.2924 0.2494 0.2435 0.0888 0.5661 0.8838 1.7822
PGD 0.1789 0.1270 0.0896 0.0286 0.6265 0.0764 0.8211
MIM 0.2375 0.2356 0.2356 0.0529 0.5300 0.1054 0.9239
AdvGAN 0.4974 0.1239 0.0568 0.1907 0.1238 0.1854 0.5567
SdpAdv (ours) 0.0330 0.0234 0.0121 0.1213 0.0204 0.0444 0.1982
(b) Model B
Attack
Classifier Non-robustified Adv-Critic Defense-GAN Adv-Train Sum
No attack 0.8910 0.8842 0.8910 0.8869 3.5531
STM 0.1112 0.1718 0.2817 0.0967 0.6614
stAdv 0.2196 0.8286 0.1812 0.4614 1.6908
SdAdv (ours) 0.1079 0.2780 0.1298 0.1420 0.6577
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
FGSM 0.2291 0.1674 0.1566 0.1810 0.4236 0.8558 1.6170
PGD 0.1157 0.0719 0.0518 0.0731 0.5547 0.0431 0.7227
MIM 0.1629 0.1540 0.1529 0.0813 0.4236 0.0515 0.7093
AdvGAN 0.2969 0.0703 0.0286 0.2040 0.0605 0.1015 0.3946
SdpAdv (ours) 0.0203 0.0095 0.0075 0.1028 0.0152 0.0392 0.1647
Table 3: Comparison of test accuracy, L2 norm, and running time Here we report the above metrics for the
non-robustified classifier with Model A. The test accuracies are copied from Table 1 and Table 2. We sample
100 images from each of the two datasets and calculate EPd [‖xA − x‖], which is the L2 norm between the
input and adversarial images. In addition, we report the running time (seconds) to generate attacks for those
100 sample images. All the attacks ran in the same machine with the same environment.  = 0.3 is used for
the attacks with perturbations, unless stated otherwise.
Dataset MNIST Fashion MNIST
Metric Acc L2 Time Acc L2 Time
FGSM 0.1902 33.42 0.05 0.2435 38.11 0.05
PGD 0.0059 25.98 0.12 0.0896 30.52 0.13
MIM 0.0868 27.17 0.10 0.2356 31.23 0.11
AdvGAN 0.1573 8.29 0.01 0.0568 10.91 0.02
STM 0.4959 71.08 0.15 0.1063 57.21 0.15
stAdv 0.1305 13.35 620.8 0.0705 6.19 609.7
SdAdv 0.0517 120.66 0.05 0.1762 94.23 0.05
SdpAdv ( = 0.1) 0.0418 111.7 0.06 0.0330 81.70 0.06
SdpAdv ( = 0.3) 0.0204 112.92 0.06 0.0121 44.73 0.06
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a new adversarial attack method, named SdpAdv, named SdpAdv,
which generates adversarial examples with both spatial distortions and perturbations. Specifically,
given an input image, SdpAdv applies affine transformations to conduct spatial distortions and then
adds perturbations to the spatially distorted image to generate the final adversarial example. As a
differentiable approach, SdpAdv leverages the amortized optimisation with two neural networks to
obtain the optimal parameter of affine transformations and the optimal perturbations, respectively.
Extensive experiments of attacking different kinds of non-robustified classifiers and robust classi-
fiers have shown that our method achieves the state-of-the-art performance in the comparison with
advanced attack parallels. More importantly, in the use of spatial distortions, our proposed approach
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(a) Original images (b) PGD, =0.3, acc=0.0059 (c) AdvGAN, =0.3, acc=0.157
(d) STM, acc=0.4959 (e) stAdv, acc=0.1305 (f) SdpAdv, =0.1, acc=0.0517
Figure 3: Sample images and their adversarial attacks against Model A in MNIST. The predicted labels of
Model A are shown above the images. The test accuracies are copied from Table 1.
can produce more realistic adversarial examples with smaller perturbations, which can challenge
classifiers well without affecting human predictions.
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(a) Original images (b) PGD, =0.3, acc=0.0896 (c) AdvGAN, =0.3, acc=0.056
(d) STM, acc=0.1063 (e) stAdv, acc=0.0705 (f) SdpAdv, =0.1, acc=0.0330
Figure 4: Sample images and their adversarial attacks against Model A in Fashion MNIST. The test accuracies
are copied from Table 2.
11
Preprint
REFERENCES
Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of
security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples. In ICML, pp. 274–283, 2018.
Shumeet Baluja and Ian Fischer. Learning to attack: Adversarial transformation networks. In AAAI,
2018.
Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks. In 2017
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 39–57, 2017.
Taco S Cohen and Max Welling. Transformation properties of learned visual representations. ICLR,
2015.
Yinpeng Dong, Fangzhou Liao, Tianyu Pang, Hang Su, Jun Zhu, Xiaolin Hu, and Jianguo Li. Boost-
ing adversarial attacks with momentum. In CVPR, pp. 9185–9193, 2018.
Beranger Dumont, Simona Maggio, and Pablo Montalvo. Robustness of rotation-equivariant net-
works to adversarial perturbations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.06627, 2018.
Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil Ozair,
Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Generative adversarial nets. In NeurIPS, pp. 2672–2680,
2014a.
Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial
examples. ICLR, 2014b.
Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. Deep residual learning for image recog-
nition. In CVPR, pp. 770–778, 2016.
Max Jaderberg, Karen Simonyan, Andrew Zisserman, et al. Spatial transformer networks. In
NeurIPS, pp. 2017–2025, 2015.
Diederik P Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Adversarial machine learning at scale. ICLR,
2016.
Yann LeCun and Corrina Cortes. The MNIST database of handwritten digits. 1998.
Yann LeCun, Le´on Bottou, Yoshua Bengio, Patrick Haffner, et al. Gradient-based learning applied
to document recognition. Proceedings of the IEEE, 86(11):2278–2324, 1998.
Karel Lenc and Andrea Vedaldi. Understanding image representations by measuring their equivari-
ance and equivalence. In CVPR, pp. 991–999, 2015.
Xuanqing Liu and Cho-Jui Hsieh. Rob-GAN: Generator, discriminator, and adversarial attacker. In
CVPR, pp. 11234–11243, 2019.
Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu.
Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. ICLR, 2018.
Alexander Matyasko and Lap-Pui Chau. Improved network robustness with adversary critic. In
NeurIPS, pp. 10578–10587, 2018.
Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. DeepFool: A simple and
accurate method to fool deep neural networks. In CVPR, pp. 2574–2582, 2016.
Anh Nguyen, Jason Yosinski, and Jeff Clune. Deep neural networks are easily fooled: High confi-
dence predictions for unrecognizable images. In CVPR, pp. 427–436, 2015.
Augustus Odena, Christopher Olah, and Jonathon Shlens. Conditional image synthesis with auxil-
iary classifier GANs. In ICML, pp. 2642–2651, 2017.
12
Preprint
Nicolas Papernot, Fartash Faghri, Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow, Reuben Feinman, Alexey Ku-
rakin, Cihang Xie, Yash Sharma, Tom Brown, Aurko Roy, Alexander Matyasko, Vahid Behzadan,
Karen Hambardzumyan, Zhishuai Zhang, Yi-Lin Juang, Zhi Li, Ryan Sheatsley, Abhibhav Garg,
Jonathan Uesato, Willi Gierke, Yinpeng Dong, David Berthelot, Paul Hendricks, Jonas Rauber,
and Rujun Long. Technical report on the cleverhans v2.1.0 adversarial examples library. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1610.00768, 2018.
Pouya Samangouei, Maya Kabkab, and Rama Chellappa. Defense-GAN: Protecting classifiers
against adversarial attacks using generative models. ICLR, 2018.
Yang Song, Rui Shu, Nate Kushman, and Stefano Ermon. Constructing unrestricted adversarial
examples with generative models. In NeurIPS, pp. 8312–8323, 2018.
Florian Trame`r, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Dan Boneh, and Patrick Mc-
Daniel. Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses. ICLR, 2018.
Jonathan Uesato, Brendan ODonoghue, Pushmeet Kohli, and Aaron Oord. Adversarial risk and the
dangers of evaluating against weak attacks. In ICML, pp. 5032–5041, 2018.
Chaowei Xiao, Bo Li, Jun-Yan Zhu, Warren He, Mingyan Liu, and Dawn Song. Generating adver-
sarial examples with adversarial networks. In IJCAI, pp. 3905–3911, 2018a.
Chaowei Xiao, Jun-Yan Zhu, Bo Li, Warren He, Mingyan Liu, and Dawn Song. Spatially trans-
formed adversarial examples. ICLR, 2018b.
Han Xiao, Kashif Rasul, and Roland Vollgraf. Fashion-MNIST: A novel image dataset for bench-
marking machine learning algorithms, 2017.
A APPENDIX
A.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. Give x, suppose u (x) and v(x) are the optimal solution of the affine parameter matrix and
perturbation for Eq. (3), respectively. We first prove that [u(x), v(x)] := h∗ (x) almost everywhere
w.r.t the probability measure Pd, where h∗(x) :=
[
h∗sd(x), h
∗
p
(
th∗sd(x)(x)
)]
. h∗(x) consists of the
optimal solution of Eq. (4). By the definition of u, v, it is obvious that
`f
(
th∗sd(x)(x) + h
∗
p
(
th∗sd(x)(x)
))
≤ `f (tu(x)(x) + v (x)).
Furthermore, it follows that:
EPd
[
`f
(
th∗sd(x)(x) + h
∗
p
(
th∗sd(x)(x)
))]
≤ EPd
[
`f (tu(x)(x) + v (x))
]
.
Since Hsd has infinite capacity, there exists husd ∈ Hsd such that husd = u. We further define
k(x) = v
(
t−1husd(x) (x)
)
and obtain k
(
thusd(x) (x)
)
= v(x). Similarly, with the infinite capacity
property ofHp, there exists hvp ∈ Hp such that hvp = k
Referring to the definition of h∗, we have:
EPd
[
`f
(
th∗sd(x)(x) + h
∗
p
(
th∗sd(x)(x)
))]
≥ EPd
[
`f
(
thusp(x) (x) + h
v
p
(
thusp(x) (x)
))]
,
EPd
[
`f
(
th∗sd(x)(x) + h
∗
p
(
th∗sd(x)(x)
))]
≥ EPd
[
`f (tu(x) (x) + v (x))
]
,
which further implies the equality:
EPd
[
`f
(
th∗sd(x)(x) + h
∗
p
(
th∗sd(x)(x)
))]
= EPd
[
`f (tu(x)(x) + v (x))
]
,
and also [u(x), v(x)] := h∗ (x) almost every w.r.t the probability measure Pd.
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